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PREFACE
This series is principally concerned with current policy issues of
importance to developing countries but also covers those relevant to
countries in transition. The focus is upon policies which affect the
management of natural resources in support of sustainable livelihoods.
Much of the series will be devoted to concerns affecting the livelihoods of
poor people in rural areas, recognizing the linkages with non-natural
resource-based livelihoods. It will also include the interests of the urban
poor, where these are linked to the use of natural resources as part of
livelihood strategies.
The series will take a holistic view and cover both the economic and social
components affecting livelihoods, and associated factors notably with
respect to health and education. The aim is to provide topical analyses
which are based upon field research where appropriate, and which will
inform development practitioners concerned with issues of poverty in
development.
The series is timely, given the increasing focus upon poverty and poverty
elimination in the agenda of the development community. It is also timely
with respect to the growing body of recent work which seeks to replace
earlier, simplistic structural adjustment programmes, with more flexible
approaches to livelihoods, institutions and partnerships.
Policy analysis is often assumed to be the remit of social scientists alone.
Whilst it is recognized that social science may play a pivotal role,
interactions with other disciplines may also be critical in understanding and
analysing policy issues of importance to the poor. The series therefore
draws upon a wide range of social and natural scientific disciplines
reflecting the resources base at the Natural Resources Institute.
iv
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper explores issues and experiences in rural finance, focusing on
its potential to alleviate poverty in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
Consideration is given to the types of services demanded by the rural
poor. Women have a special position in this because they are poorly
served by existing services, despite their predominance among the
poorest sectors of society, and the important role they play in the rural
economy.
Most experience with the provision of rural financial services has focused
on livelihood promotion aiming to increase productivity and incomes
through improved access to cheap credit. Yet this has had relatively little
impact on poverty, because programmes have proved unsustainable and
have been criticized for promoting inappropriate investments and
indebtedness. The poor are often more concerned with livelihood
protection and maintaining minimal standards of living. Fragile and high-
risk livelihoods require insurance or insurance substitutes, and for this
reason the poor may prefer savings over investment.
Whilst micro-finance plays an important role in rural economies, the poor
face considerable difficulties in accessing it. This reflects poor information,
high risks, lack of collateral, physical distance from service providers, and
small individual transaction requirements. Together, these factors increase
the cost of servicing the poor. This is exacerbated by perceptions of the
poor as being uncreditworthy, unable to save and therefore a potential
liability. The informal sector has evolved to overcome these constraints
and has flourished, whilst the formal sector has failed to reach the poor.
There is little evidence that the informal sector is necessarily exploitative;
its main problems are that it is limited to short-term finance and is small
scale.
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Improvements to financial services, both formal and informal, must be
tailored to the needs of the poor. This requires innovative approaches to
lower costs and increased accessibility. Two key strategies are savings
mobilization, and linking the informal and formal sectors. Banks could help
mobilize the savings of the poor by removing restrictions on withdrawals
from savings accounts and simplifying lending operations and procedures.
Credit access programmes should aim to increase women’s access to
credit within the formal sector, either through direct contact or by linking
informal and formal financial activities.
The decentralized/linkage banking model has considerable potential. It
seeks to build on the relative strengths of existing formal and informal
units. It adopts a holistic approach, which integrates the complementary
roles of financial and non-financial public and non-governmental
organizations in reducing gaps in the supply of financial services to the
poor. Group-based activities, both for savings and credit, can potentially
play a significant role in improving access to financial services, as they
provide a means for risk-sharing and a reduction of transaction costs.
Attention must be given to the limitations of the poor in making savings
and, importantly, using credit in productive ways. The impact on incomes
tends to be greater when credit is combined with non-financial business
development activities. The macro-economic context is also critical: price
stability and fiscal policy are particularly important factors.
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1
INTRODUCTION
This is one of a series of papers which seeks to elaborate the relationship
between poverty, rural livelihoods and key policy areas. The papers are
intended for a wide audience in developing country governments, donor
agencies, research institutes and other organizations concerned with
development or governance. They are intended to contribute to an
increased focus on poverty by informing and stimulating debate, policy and
action amongst key players in the development process.
This paper was originally prepared as a briefing paper for the European
Union (EU). The EU briefing papers have sub-Saharan Africa as their
primary focus, although case study material may also be drawn from other
African/Caribbean/Pacific country experience. The information they contain
is based principally on a review of secondary data and documentation,
although some specific aspects have been explored through short,
focused field studies.
The purpose of this paper is to alert policy-makers and development
practitioners to the key policy issues which arise in the context of rural
finance and poverty alleviation. Rural finance encompasses the availability
and accessibility of credit, savings and insurance services. Rural finance in
this paper is considered in two ways:
. firstly, as a means to invest in productivity and increase profits for
both farmers and those involved in non-farm income-generating
activities
. secondly, as a way to provide security or insurance to poor families in
order to alleviate the adverse affects brought about through problems,
such as drought, which reduce their incomes below that required to
maintain a minimum acceptable standard of living.
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The ways in which these financial needs are met, and the mechanisms
required to enable this, tend to overlap. There are no discrete paths for
either investment finance or the provision of security.
This paper addresses three sets of issues relating to rural finance and
poverty alleviation:
. the types of finance required by the rural poor;
. the delivery mechanisms currently in place, both formal and informal;
and
. the steps required, where appropriate, to improve both availability and
accessibility of financial services.
The focus of the discussions in this paper is on ‘the poor’, with specific
consideration given to women, who make up 70% of those classified as
poor by the UN Development Programme. Although we do not attempt to
debate poverty definitions, it is recognized that the poor are not a
homogeneous group, and that they have different needs and levels of
access to financial services.
4
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2
FINANCIAL NEEDS OF THE POOR
EXPERIENCE WITH CREDIT PROGRAMMES
It was widely believed that the provision of credit for the rural poor would
result in significant productivity increases. As a consequence, large amounts
of money have been channelled to micro-finance programmes over the past
20–30 years, much of it providing cheap credit for agricultural production.
This supply-led approach was based on the premise that credit was an
important entry point for promoting development, and that advances in other
sectors such as health and education would follow naturally.
Many of these interventions have proved to be disappointing (for example,
see Adams and Von Pischke, 1992). Although initial criticisms targeted the
design of the policies and programmes, more recent evidence suggests
that the concept was flawed (Dawson and Jeans, 1997).
. Firstly, it is apparent that access to productive credit (investments in
productive activities) cannot alone increase incomes in the renewable
natural resources (RNR) sector. Individuals and small enterprises also
require a conducive economic environment which creates incentives
for production, and services which facilitate market access (including
transport infrastructure and market information systems). Supply-led,
subsidized credit may lead to inappropriate investments and,
consequently, indebtedness.
. Secondly, low productivity is only one component of poverty; access
to health care, education and political representation represent other
dimensions of poverty. Only by adopting a broader, holistic approach
will ambitious poverty reduction targets be met.
. Thirdly, an initial presumption was that the poor had no other financial
service needs apart from productive credit. A deeper understanding of
5
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the financial needs of the poor has dispelled this myth. Projects now
are less likely to focus narrowly on productive credit; increasingly they
include savings components and, occasionally, insurance.
NEEDS OF THE POOR
The poor require a range of financial services, such as opportunities to
safeguard earned income, or credit to enable them to maintain minimum
levels of consumption throughout the year. The rural economies within
which the majority of poor people live and work are characterized by
numerous small transactions. Although the units of exchange in these
‘penny economies’ appear small and insignificant to outsiders, they are an
essential component of rural households’ livelihoods. The extent of financial
services demanded by the poor is only now being fully appreciated.
A useful distinction can be made between livelihood promotion and
livelihood protection (Dreze and Sen, 1989, p. 60). Promotion is concerned
with improving standards of living, principally through increasing
productivity and incomes. Protection is essentially social security
concerned with maintaining living standards and incomes at a given level,
and defending livelihoods against unexpected shocks. Clearly the two
concepts are complementary. The promotion of livelihoods will tend to
make them more robust and able to withstand shocks, whilst sound
protection will lay the basis for livelihood promotion. Micro-finance has an
important role in the achievement of both promotion and protection goals.
Livelihood promotion
Productive finance
The rural poor may require productive finance (i.e. investment and working
capital) for a variety of income-generating activities. The most important
are shown in Table 1, which lists the kinds of activity requiring finance and
the normal time frame over which that finance is required. A less purist
perspective would permit some ‘consumption’ investments to be included
in this table, because they positively affect productivity. For instance, Zellor
et al. (1997) observe that investments in education, health and nutrition
have a positive and long-term impact on productivity. Many people
considered too resource-poor to make financial investments in productive
enterprise do so through less direct paths when given the opportunity.
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Table 1 Examples of productive finance needs of the poor in the RNR sector
Productive finance needs
Income
source
Activity More than one
season
One season Less than one
season
Smallholder Seasonal
intensive
cropping
Land preparation
Irrigation
infrastructure
Inputs (seed,
agro-chemicals,
hiring labour)
Harvest labour,
equipment hire
Seasonal
extensive
cropping
Inputs (seed,
agro-chemicals,
hiring labour)
Harvest labour,
equipment hire
Tree crops Initial investment
in trees plus
maintenance until
mature
Seasonal inputs:
fungicides, pesticides
Harvest labour,
equipment hire
Small-scale,
intensive
livestock
activities
Veterinary services
(preventative)
Building for housing
livestock
Fencing land
Purchasing animals
Artificial insemination
Veterinary services
(preventative and
curative)
Feed
Veterinary
services (curative)
Labour hire
Pastoralist
(communal
land,
extensive)
Livestock
for meat
Veterinary services
(preventative)
Purchasing and
rearing animals
Artificial insemination
Veterinary services
(preventative and
curative)
Veterinary
services (curative)
Labour hire
Livestock
for by-
products
(dairy etc.)
Veterinary services
(preventative)
Purchasing and
rearing animals
Veterinary services
(preventative and
curative)
Veterinary
services (curative)
Landless
labourer
(Seasonal)
labour: may
involve
seasonal
migration
Skills training
Small-scale
marketing
Storage of
produce
Construction of
storage facilities
Purchase of stocks
for storage
Fumigation/pest
control
Retailing
produce
Renting market site
Wholesale purchase
of commodities
Small-scale
processing
Equipment
Buildings
Inputs: labour, fuel
for machinery, etc.
Purchase of raw
material
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Livelihood protection
Consumption credit
The poor are vulnerable: they often experience periods of consumption
shortfalls. This is generally manifested by periods of food insecurity when
access to food is reduced. The majority of the poor in developing countries
are directly or indirectly dependent upon the RNR sector for their
livelihoods. The seasonal nature of the RNR sector leads to fluctuating
labour and capital demands, and to uneven production and income flows.
The high risks in agricultural production, especially in marginal areas, and
unsteady, uncertain incomes contribute to vulnerability and threaten
consumption. Shortfalls may occur seasonally and regularly (for instance
prior to the harvest period); or may be longer term (as, for instance, with
environmental degradation and soil erosion); or may be unforeseen and
sudden (as with external shocks such as drought, flood or a sharp decline
in wage levels or the prices of commodities sold by the poor). During such
periods, consumption credit may be needed to make up the temporary
shortfall. Where credit is not available, households may have to deplete
their asset base (spend savings, or sell jewels or livestock) or go without
essential items, including food.
Access to consumption credit may play an important role in the coping
strategies of the poor. To cope with consumption crises, households may
employ a number of actions to increase liquidity. These include:
supplementing income, possibly through hiring out labour; depleting
savings, including the sale of assets; or borrowing, typically from informal
sources such as friends or relatives. In extreme cases, households may
be forced into depleting their productive resource base in order to survive.
Selling land or livestock or defaulting on loans runs the real risk of
plunging households into a downward spiral of deprivation. Access to
consumption credit can therefore play a critical role in protecting the
livelihoods of the poor. It tends to be short-term, needs to be accessed at
short notice, and does not necessarily confer any ability to repay.
Insurance
Fragile and high-risk livelihoods require insurance or insurance substitutes.
Attempts to arrange insurance against the production risks faced by the
poor have proved difficult to sustain. Multi-peril crop insurance schemes
8
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targeted at the poor have generally been expensive failures (Hazell, 1992).
The reasons for this include high administrative costs, and political inability
on the part of governments to charge fair premiums and enforce impartial
loss adjustments. The net result seems to have been that these insurance
schemes represented a form of subsidy with very limited value to the poor.
Any financially sustainable scheme is likely to focus on large-scale
commercial farmers who can afford to pay higher premiums. Formal
insurance thus has very little relevance to the poor.
However, to protect themselves against risk, poor households employ a
number of different strategies which are, in effect, insurance substitutes.
These include:
. saving (money or assets which can be accessed at times of need)
. risk-reducing behaviour (for example, low-yielding but drought-tolerant
crop choices)
. investment in social capital (for example, investing in informal ‘social
safety nets’, such as developing ties with peers and relatives to
increase access to potential assistance in times of need).
Although such actions may detract from investment in increased
productivity, they might nonetheless be preferable to dependence on
consumption credit (even assuming it is available). The poor are risk-
averse and do not want to be caught in a debt trap or jeopardize assets
by using them as collateral. The amount of credit available is, in a sense,
a household asset. Households may try to maintain this asset and opt for
alternative coping strategies, such as reducing food intake, rather than risk
defaulting on a loan and jeopardizing their creditworthiness.
Even though the poor may have no choice other than these informal
sources of insurance, this should not detract from the value of these
systems.
This kind of insurance responds to both the customary and unusual
needs of lineage members – providing old-age and catastrophic
insurance, substituting for a welfare system, and enhancing the security
of individuals and society. Based on intimate personal knowledge of
both recipients and transferors, it is more efficient than either market-
based private insurance or a governmental insurance scheme in that it
achieves more safety at a lower cost. A vibrant transfer economy
9
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therefore considerably lessens the need for alternative insurance or
safety net institutions and renders much less compelling the necessity
for social security and welfare legislation in Africa.
(Dia, 1996, p. 191).
Savings
Savings have several potential roles. By foregoing consumption,
households will increase their options in the future, whether for investment
or consumption. The poor may choose to accumulate savings rather than
invest in productive activities. As noted above, savings serve as insurance.
The poor want to avoid periods of transitory food insecurity and therefore
they accumulate precautionary savings, which increase household
resilience and the capacity to absorb risks (Zellor et al., 1997, p. 21).
A preference for savings (over investment), coupled with general risk
aversion, constrains the adoption of new technologies by the poor.
Households with limited access to finance may hold larger precautionary
savings (or have higher optimal levels of precautionary savings), even
though this will reduce potential income generation. Only in the longer run,
as a secondary course of action, may they be able to afford productive
investments which increase (rather than protect) their incomes (Zellor et
al., 1997, p. 20).
People may also save to safeguard their money from their own personal
consumption, from consumption by another (for instance, a woman may try
to safeguard money from her husband), or from theft. In some countries,
people will even pay to save (demonstrated by the susu system described
later in this paper), so strong is the need for the safe-keeping of income.
SUMMARIZING THE FINANCIAL NEEDS OF THE POOR
. The financial needs of the poor are far more sophisticated than mere
livelihood promotion through productive finance.
. The two goals of micro-finance (livelihood promotion and protection),
and the four elements of finance (productive credit, consumption
credit, savings, and insurance), are closely interrelated, with
implications for the design of interventions.
. The poor are not a homogeneous group; they have different needs
and different levels of access to financial services.
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Micro-finance plays an essential role in the livelihoods of the poor, and can
contribute to poverty reduction. Zellor et al. (1997, p. 25) identify three
pathways through which household food security (and poverty) can be
influenced by micro-finance:
. via income generation – by creating additional capital to increase
household production, and by increasing savings and thereby
increasing risk-bearing capacity, which in turn contributes to the
adoption of income-generating activities;
. via asset investment or disinvestment strategies to smooth disposable
income over time to assure sufficient food consumption levels; and
. via consumption credit, which can substitute for higher-cost insurance
strategies.
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3
CONSTRAINTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
MICRO-FINANCE FOR THE RURAL POOR
SOURCES OF MICRO-FINANCE SERVICES
A clear distinction is often made between informal and formal financial
services. In practice, this distinction is far from clear: a whole spectrum of
financial institutions exists, ranging from highly informal intra-household
arrangements for distributing resources, to state-regulated commercial
banks. The formal sector can be defined as comprising those institutions
which are subjected to government and central bank regulation (Zellor et
al., 1997, p. 83). These include commercial banks and specialist
agricultural financial organizations, savings and credit cooperatives/unions,
and finance programmes operated by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). Conversely, the informal sector operates unofficially and escapes
regulation. It comprises a multitude of different institutions and activities,
which together play a significant role in many SSA economies. For
example, although measurement is troublesome, Buckley (1996, p. 339)
concludes that the informal sector in Malawi is more significant than the
formal sector.
There are therefore many different sources of micro-finance services,
although access to these is variable. When considering the poor, who
frequently are not serviced by the formal sector, the significance of the
informal sector is magnified. Indeed, the poor often depend exclusively on
the informal sector for their financial needs.
12
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CONSTRAINTS TO FORMAL SECTOR PROVISION OF MICRO-
FINANCE SERVICES FOR THE POOR
Information is vital for the provision of credit. When lenders have imperfect
information concerning the ability and willingness of potential borrowers to
repay the loan, three problems arise (from Zellor et al., 1997):
. the lender does not know the default risk (creditworthiness) of each
potential borrower, and to collect this information is costly – the
problem of screening;
. it is costly to ensure that the potential borrowers will take those
actions which will make loan repayment more likely; and
. it is difficult (and costly) to enforce repayment.
To reduce loan delinquency and fraudulent use of bank payment facilities
(such as cheques), relations between banks and customers tend to be
information-intensive. They often require new depositors to be introduced
by existing ones, and may restrict the provision of facilities such as
cheques and credit to customers meeting specified criteria. They also use
screening devices including track records and references, collateral
requirements and standardized credit appraisal systems involving cost-
benefit and cash-flow analysis to minimize default risks.
The information systems that these devices require add to transaction
costs. Transaction costs are those costs incurred during an exchange of
assets or services other than the price of the asset or service itself.
Transaction costs are often fixed costs (for instance, the time spent setting
up the loan may be the same for small and large loans), so smaller loans
and savings incur higher per unit transaction costs, making lending to the
poor (whose needs are for small amounts) relatively more expensive.
Transaction costs associated with lending may be passed on to the
borrower via higher interest rates.
The information-intensive system of centralized control, which reflects risk-
averse strategies of formal financial institutions (FFIs), could be attributed
in part to heavy regulation. Financial systems tend to be heavily regulated
for the purpose of maintaining stability and protecting the interests of
depositors. ‘Traditional’ management and organizational systems in most
banks in SSA evolved historically from the colonial origins of banking in
the continent (as noted by Newlyn and Rowan, 1954; Fry, 1976; Howard,
13
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1978). The indigenous population, including the entrepreneurial class, was
largely neglected by the colonial banks (Howard, 1978; Brett, 1995). Post-
independence indigenous commercial and development banks were
modelled on these systems, and have changed little since (despite the
dramatic changes that banking systems have undergone elsewhere). As a
result the operations of FFIs continue to favour commerce and large-scale
industry, and to neglect the needs of the poor (Brownbridge and Gockel,
1996).
For poor borrowers, the use of track records is hampered by the absence
of a record-keeping culture due to high levels of illiteracy and the lack of
formality which characterizes their economic transactions. Even though the
economic activities in which they are engaged usually involve high and
covariant risks, insurance markets and hedging instruments are virtually
non-existent, resulting in exposure of lenders to high default risks. The use
of collateral requirements to minimize risk exposure is often not possible in
the case of the poor. This is either because they lack assets which can be
collateralized; or because the utility of such assets, where available, is
substantially reduced by enforcement difficulties due to weaknesses in the
judicial system, and socio-cultural factors such as common property rights
(especially in the case of land) and strong communal ties. Banks,
therefore, prefer not to lend to the poor.
The banks’ internal control and management information systems are
often excessively bureaucratic, resulting in decision-making delays likely to
render a loan request obsolete if the client is engaged in time-sensitive
activities such as rain-fed agriculture. This bureaucracy promotes, among
bank branches and the industry as a whole, an inflexible uniformity of
operating systems and culture (including information requirements from
customers, banking hours, banking environment, often well-furnished
premises, and staff dress code). This adds to costs, limits the capacity of
individual branches to adjust creatively to prevailing socio-economic
conditions, and alienates significant sections of the poor.
Interest-bearing savings accounts tend to be more popular with the poor,
especially the illiterate poor. This appears to be less because of the
interest earned (there is evidence that they often patronize informal
deposit facilities with negative nominal returns; Gurgand et al., 1994), but
more because they are simple to operate. Unlike current (or demand
deposit) accounts, which the banks favour, they require only thumbprint
14
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and photographs instead of signatures to authenticate transactions.
Balances are recorded in passbooks which can be confirmed by others
(such as literate relations).
However, withdrawals from savings accounts are often restricted and
holders of these accounts tend to be excluded from accessing credit. This
exclusion has been found to discourage savings mobilization among the
poor. ‘Reciprocity’ has been identified as a major incentive to holding
financial savings in SSA countries (Gurgand et al., 1994). Current (or
demand deposit) accounts which do not have such restrictions entail some
direct costs (customers are usually charged ‘commission on the turnover’)
and are relatively more complex to operate for the illiterate poor.
Problems of servicing the poor are compounded by ignorance. The poor
may be perceived as uncreditworthy, unable to save, and a potential
liability. Therefore commercial institutions (and also some state institutions
and NGOs) are unwilling to provide or improve the services on offer to
poorer sectors of society. For their part, the poor may distrust or feel
intimidated by formal institutions.
THE INFORMAL RURAL FINANCIAL SECTOR
The informal sector has evolved to overcome the constraints listed above,
and has flourished whilst the formal sector has failed to reach the poor.
Transaction costs have been minimized by innovations adapted to local
social and economic conditions.
Johnson and Rogaly (1997, p. 16) make the distinction between those
informal financial services that are owned by their users, and those that
are supplied by an individual, normally at a profit. Box 1 lists some types
of informal finance and illustrates the variety of informal finance institutions
and mechanisms. Not all people have access to all options, although most
people are involved in a complex web of debts and credits to relatives,
friends, neighbours and merchants. For example, social exclusion may
rule out participation in group-based activities, and some people may not
have enough capital to join rotating savings and credit associations
(ROSCAs). This particularly applies to the poorest of the poor, and to
some extent explains their difficulties in getting out of poverty. Socially
outcast, the poorest can remain trapped in life-long indebtedness.
15
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Box 1 Types of informal micro-finance
Sophisticated but unregulated institutions. Regulation may be minimal, such as a licence
to operate. Examples include credit unions, indigenous banks, pawnshops.
Moneylenders. Individuals involved in lending money. These are often short-term loans,
unsecured by collateral, and charged at high interest rates. Interest rates are typically
charged at a daily, weekly or monthly rate. Money lenders are able to provide quick
access to funds and do not impose conditions on how the funds are used. They are
rarely financial intermediaries as they provide the funds from their own equity.
Transaction costs are low due to their exploitation of local information. Clients tend to be
long-standing, minimizing the amount of new information that has to be collected.
Merchants. Individuals who are primarily traders who also extend loans linked to the
sale or purchase of commodities. No interest may be charged; instead they may alter
the price of the commodity they are receiving in return. This provides a good example of
how the micro-finance market is linked to other markets.
Shopkeepers. For example, in Somalia shopkeepers play a role in providing credit which
is especially important for small-scale farmers unable to access formal sources of credit.
52% of small-scale farmers took loans from shopkeepers, mainly for consumption; about
half of loans from shopkeepers were in the form of food (DeLancey, 1992).
Pawnbrokers. Need almost no information about the borrower as the collateral is
physically exchanged for the loan. Pawnbrokers may need a licence to operate.
Loan brokers. Individuals who facilitate contacts among people with money to lend and
borrowers, essentially exploiting ‘inside’ information about potential clients.
Landlords. Provide tenants with loans, particularly sharecropping tenants, as the
landlord has a vested interest in the production.
Friends and family. Possibly the most prevalent form of informal finance. Often no
interest or collateral, but may be based on reciprocity.
Money guard. A person who safeguards cash for individuals. Rarely does any interest
accrue to the saver, and in many instances the saver will actually pay a fee to the
money guard for keeping the money safe.
Savings groups. Individuals either regularly or irregularly deposit funds with a group
leader. Savings may be for specific occasions such as weddings or funerals.
ROSCAs. Rotating savings and credit associations savings are made regularly by
members and are pooled. The savings are given to members in turn, or loans are made
to members. Peer pressure, fear of loss of the facility and possible social sanction act
as the incentive to repay. There is complete freedom within the ROSCA to spend money
on whatever the member desires, including consumables.
ASCRAs. Accumulated savings and credit associations. These are essentially non-
rotating savings and credit groups, more advanced than ROSCAs, with opportunities for
saving and loans.
Employers. Employees may either ask employers for advances on their pay, or request
the employer to withhold payment until a later date, though there will be no interest paid
on these sums.
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Group activities have drawn particular attention. Self-help groups provide
mutual benefits for members, and are non-profit-seeking in their activities.
Membership of financial self-help groups is very prevalent in sub-Saharan
Africa, and nearly universal in some locations. Box 2 illustrates the
characteristics and functions of financial self-help groups in The Gambia.
In Cameroon, Schrieder and Cuevas (1992) found 80% of all adult family
members participating in at least one financial self-help group, with 71% of
the groups providing loan services. These groups provide 27% of all loan
requirements and 54% of total financial savings in Cameroon.
In the light of research into the extent of informal finance in rural
economies, a new perception of the informal sector emerged during the
1980s. The following points are based on the work of Adams (1992).
Box 2 Group financial activities in The Gambia (from Shipton, 1992)
Gambian villages have groups known as kafo, organized around age, specific activities,
political interests, etc. Membership is voluntary. Larger ones may have elected officers.
They tend to be gender-specific. Kafo groups serve diverse economic purposes. Money
may be saved from hiring out group labour, fund-raising events or members’ dues.
Larger, stronger kafos may save money in group bank accounts (linking formal and
informal sectors) and may make large investments in community projects, such as
community centres or agricultural projects. Money may be lent to group members, often
as small loans with interest. A common purpose of kafos is to help members in times of
emergency. Recently, both government and NGOs have looked to kafos as a means of
disbursing loans, particularly as channels for seed and fertilizer supply. The basis of
kafos is social capital with social sanctions used to impose discipline.
A newer form of group is the osusu, essentially a ROSCA. In The Gambia, these are
typically organized by women. A 1987 survey revealed that 17% of women and 1% of
men belonged to an osusu. All members make fixed contributions of money at regular
intervals and each time one member takes it all. If a member’s turn comes early, it is a
credit mechanism; if it comes late, it is a savings mechanism (early recipients realize a
real net gain, those later a real net loss). Osusu tend to be grouped around age, ethnic
identity and kin, though mixed groups are also common. Some osusu run for many
years; others suspend operations in the wet season when members are short of money.
The positive attributes of these types of group are that they shelter money; provide
services to those ineligible for formal banking; require no collateral; minimize paperwork
and travel; increase social ties; instil a feeling of local ownership; and are voluntary. The
negative points are that they are not ideally suited to communities with seasonal
income, as needs for funds come at the same time for all members; and loans are not
available on demand.
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. Informal finance is ubiquitous in developing countries even where
formal markets exist. Attempts to replace indigenous institutions with
introduced institutions have had limited impact. As a consequence,
there has been a softening of attitudes towards the informal sector
amongst policy-makers and development practitioners.
. Informal finance exists within and between all economic classes.
Informal finance has traditionally been viewed as inferior to formal
finance, and as flourishing only due to the inability of formal finance to
reach the poor. However, recent research has found that wealthier
people also continue to use the informal sector for certain services,
despite good access to formal institutions; see for example Heidhues’
(1994) study of micro-finance in Cameroon. The function of informal
transfers in African societies has, in the West, been replaced to a
certain extent by economic institutions far removed from the African
extended family/community, but this does not imply that these
economic institutions are in any way superior.
. Informal financial markets are adapted to local conditions. Indigenous
financial institutions have evolved over a period of time and are rooted
in local culture and society, many of these being communities
dependent upon the renewable natural resources sector. They have
developed as a response to particular constraints faced by inhabitants
of diverse environments. Informal financial markets are more
adaptable to sudden needs and changes and are thus better able to
accommodate a short-notice loan request, or a delayed payment.
. Informal finance provides a wide range of services. The needs of the
poor are considerably wider than provided for by the formal sector,
including savings, short-term consumption loans and insurance.
. There is little evidence of exploitative or monopolistic behaviour.
Contrary to previous beliefs, the informal sector is now considered to
be, in general, non-exploitative (though there are some important
exceptions to this). High interest rates may be charged, but generally
only on very short-term loans, or where costs or risks are very high.
. Informal finance benefits the poor. The poor, as we have seen, have
little access to the formal finance sector, and depend on the informal
sector. Their financial demands differ significantly from wealthier
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sectors of society, as they have vulnerable livelihoods, and require
short-term cash injections to avoid periods of food insecurity and
deprivation. The formal sector is not designed to respond to their
demands.
. Informal finance enhances the efficiency of resource allocation.
Financial intermediation, expressed simply, is the movement of money
from those who have an excess to those who have a shortage. This
can happen at many different levels: between countries, within
countries, within communities, and within households. The principle is
the same whatever the scale, and the movement of money to those
who make use of it improves resource allocation efficiency. A study of
Senegal (Dia, 1996) reveals that the informal transfer economy results
in a more equitable distribution of income; with transfers being used
for health and education, it increases the access of the poor to these
services/investments.
. Major elements of informal markets are ‘intertwined’ with formal
markets. ‘‘Informal deposits often move to banks, and funds from
formal loans, when spent, often circulate through informal channels. It
appears that formal and informal finance may be complements
instead of substitutes in many cases.’’ (Adams, 1992, p. 4).
The informal sector is successful because it has features which
significantly reduce transaction costs. The key is the use of local
information and social capital. Community members know who is
creditworthy. They know who is likely to default on loans. They know who
is likely to be a reliable contributor to group savings schemes. Hence the
ability of the poor to access financial services depends greatly on social
relations with the community. If they are in any way excluded from their
community they may have difficulty in joining groups. Informal lending
between individuals and households is often based on an understanding or
reciprocity. There is a willingness to lend with a low or zero interest rate if
the lender recognizes that in time of need the favour may be returned. If
possible, people will try to maximize the number of sources of financial
assistance available to them.
Drawbacks of informal finance
(Based on Zellor et al., 1997, p. 116.)
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. Lack of medium- and long-term productive credit (for technology
uptake). The majority of credit available in the informal sector is for
consumption or, if for productive purposes, is relatively short-term in
nature, rarely extending over more than a crop cycle (for instance,
seed may be received on credit and repaid after harvest). Longer-term
credit is less common, restricting the amount of long-term investment
and planning. Larger land improvement schemes, for instance, which
require several years to recoup the initial outlay, are generally not
financed by the informal sector.
. Lack of savings options with real returns. The incentive for saving is
rarely related to potential returns; instead, as seen above, savings are
driven by the need to safeguard money or to tie up money and
therefore resist other demands upon it. Savers are even willing to pay
for this service.
. Restricted to community level and therefore unable to bear covariate
risks. As we have seen, risks are borne at both individual and
community levels. Illness or other problems affecting households or
individuals can lead to consumption shortfalls and the need for
smoothing credit, which may be available in the community. However,
a larger event such as a climatic disaster or crop failure will affect the
entire community, with large numbers of people requiring assistance.
As the geographical coverage of informal systems is relatively small,
financial intermediaries and equity lenders will struggle to access
sufficient funds to satisfy the whole community’s needs.
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4
INTERVENTIONS TO PROMOTE MICRO-
FINANCE FOR THE RURAL POOR
IS THERE A NEED FOR DIRECT INTERVENTION?
The evidence provided from a flourishing informal sector may indicate that
direct interventions are not appropriate. Abugre (1994) argues that if local
communities have adapted so well to the lack of formal services (as
shown by the proliferation of the informal sector), then why intervene at
all? It may make better sense to concentrate on stimulating informal
systems by investing in, for example, infrastructure and communication,
than to overload the system with additional credit. A more subtle approach
may be necessary, based on a thorough understanding of the sector.
Without the latter, interventions risk displacing informal services and
squeezing the options available to the poor. Subsidized interventions tend
to be unsustainable (Seibel, 1994, p. 21), and if they displace informal
systems, long-term damage to the informal sector could result.
For several reasons already noted, the provision of financial services for
the rural poor is often inherently high-cost and risky. The challenge is to
find ways to reduce and share costs, rather than supporting subsidized,
unsustainable schemes.
Above all, interventions must be tailored to the needs of service users.
The poor require certain features in financial services, which may include:
. physical accessibility – services have to be in close proximity
. flexibility of terms for savings and credit
. timely access, without delay, sometimes at short notice (particularly
for credit)
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. potential access to funds at all times
. low costs of borrowing
. security of savings.
The poor are not a homogeneous group and have different financial
needs. There are also degrees of poverty. Of particular concern to donors
are the poorest, those groups and individuals which are not reached by
most poverty reduction and welfare programmes. Policy-makers and
development practitioners also recognize the distinct needs of women and
the importance of gender/poverty linkages.
The ‘poorest of the poor’
The poor, and particularly the poorest, typically live in a semi-monetary
economy. Many transactions do not involve the exchange of money, but the
bartering of goods and services, for example the ‘goob’ (traditional work
group) in Somalia receives payment in food and drink for working (usually
specific field-based tasks such as land preparation). There is no monetary
payment, and no predefined rules for reciprocation. Similarly, financial
services may be non-monetary: assets may be held as savings, and social
capital acts as insurance. Formalizing these indigenous institutions and
customs is a difficult task, and has frequently proved fruitless. A broader
understanding is necessary of the social and economic systems in which
the poor live. A full understanding of the non-monetary forms of financial
services may contribute to the development of quite different micro-finance
intervention strategies. For example, livestock often substitute for banks
because this is how some rural communities ‘save’. Selective support to
livestock services may meet the needs of the poor better than projects
aimed at encouraging livestock sales and formal savings.
Women
Women have a special position in the provision of micro-finance. Firstly,
they are often amongst the poorest in society. Secondly, they make a
substantial contribution to a country’s development. However, women, and
poor women in particular, face special problems in accessing micro-
finance services. In many countries, most women face problems over land
rights and control over the factors of production. Lack of land ownership is
particularly problematic because of its widespread use as collateral in the
formal financial sector. In addition, in some countries it is illegal for a
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woman to borrow in her own name – women may borrow only in the name
of their husbands, if at all.
Educational inequalities act as a further barrier to women’s access to
credit – a barrier which will typically be highest for poorer women. Women
may be unable to meet the formalities of loan requirements – they may not
even be able to sign their name. Problems are compounded by prejudicial
attitudes, where formal lenders may not regard women, particularly poor
women, as prospective clients. Evidence from several schemes shows
that women can be a bankable proposition: women have higher repayment
rates than men. Programmes with high female participation have high
repayment rates, for example Fundacion para la Promocion y Desarrollo
de la Microempresa (PRODEM) (Bolivia), Grameen Bank (Bangladesh),
Working Women’s Forum (India), and the Self-employed Women’s
Association (Uganda). In Honduras, Barbados, Guatemala, Senegal,
Cameroon, Malawi, Niger, Chad and Ecuador, the US Agency for
International Development (USAID) reported higher repayment rates for
women than for men (Weidemann, 1992).
APPROACHES TO DEVELOPING MICRO-FINANCE FOR THE
RURAL POOR
Four non-exclusive strategies are discussed here:
. strengthening the formal sector
. linking the formal and informal sectors
. promoting self-help groups
. strengthening the enabling environment.
Strengthening the formal sector
These proposals address the twin objectives of enhancing bank capacity
to mobilize deposits, and lowering access barriers for the poor. They seek
to promote increased flexibility in FFIs without sacrificing established
organizational systems, contributing to any specific comparative advantage
they may enjoy over informal intermediaries.
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Enhancing deposit mobilization among the poor
Expanding the role of banks in deposit mobilization among the poor
requires increased flexibility in their systems and procedures. A study of
micro-lending organizations in Indonesia, Mexico, Ecuador, India,
Bangladesh, Kenya and Ghana demonstrated that access was increased
when ‘‘micro-lending institutions ... created a friendly environment [for the
poor] through a number of means such as simple-looking structures ... and
a staff that is dressed simply’’ (Buechler, 1995, p. 8). Banking hours need
to be flexible too. For example, the community-owned rural bank at Garu
in northern Ghana operates on Sundays, which are also market days.
Promoting savings accounts, as argued earlier, would enhance savings
mobilization among the poor. The poor would want restrictions on
withdrawals removed. Evidence from a number of studies suggests that
the poor often prefer deposit facilities which allow them to make small but
regular savings at minimal transaction cost. Banks could, therefore, adopt
the practice of informal deposit (susu) collectors, and go to depositors for
savings rather than waiting for them to make deposits. This system has
been adopted by Women’s World Banking in Ghana, and by the Credit
with Education programme in Burkina Faso. The evidence is that
administrative costs tend to be rather high. Difficulties also arise in
monitoring collection staff, to reduce the risk of fraud. These costs
discourage commercial banks from adopting this system on any
meaningful scale.
The alternative is the development of complementary relations between
banks and informal financial institutions (IFIs) such as credit unions and
susu collectors, as studied by Aryeetey (1994) and Steel et al. (1997) in
Nigeria and Ghana. Development of this has, however, been constrained by
a number of unresolved organizational issues, notably the status of the
IFIs vis-a`-vis the banks. Action research focusing on the organizational
bottlenecks could prove beneficial to all stakeholders. This type of
arrangement would promote decentralization of deposit collection, thus
lowering transaction costs for depositors, particularly small-scale women
traders. There is also scope for formalizing and expanding the sharing of
information on customers between banks and IFIs, thus addressing the
need for track records. Furthermore, the possibility of using the IFIs as loan
collection agents could be explored. There is experience of this with the use
of field workers for loan recovery by the Freedom From Hunger programme
in Burkina Faso and Ghana, and Cooperation for Development in Namibia.
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Lowering credit access barriers
In seeking to lower access barriers to credit, the primary objective is to
reduce the ‘social distance’ between FFIs and the poor by alleviating
problems of imperfect information, missing insurance markets and high
risks faced by poor entrepreneurs. Making deposit operations more poor-
friendly to increase patronage will have the additional benefit, noted
above, of improving FFI information on the poor.
This has to be complemented by simplification of the lending operations
and procedures of FFIs. The following are some of the measures required:
easy-to-complete loan application forms; simple, transparent loan decision
criteria (openly advertised); reduced red tape in decision-making; and de-
emphasis of complex financial appraisals in favour of ‘ability to repay’
criteria. (It is widely recognized in any case that credit for the poor tends
to be less for production purposes than for non-production emergencies.)
Loan repayment terms and schedules need to be flexible as well. Most
successful micro-finance schemes have found that regular repayments in
small amounts will substantially improve repayment. This could be done
through holding regular (weekly) group meetings at which members make
payments. Examples include the Kenya Rural Enterprise Programme (K-
REP), and the Freedom From Hunger projects in Burkina Faso and
Ghana). Borrowers incur additional costs, particularly in terms of meeting
time, but in the latter case the regularity of meetings is reduced as
customers establish a credible track record with the banks. The women
traders’ credit programme by Cooperation for Development in Namibia
uses an alternative arrangement, involving regular visits to borrowers by
credit officers to collect scheduled instalments. In this case the additional
cost of debt recovery is borne by the FFI, although it may be reflected in
interest rates charged to borrowers.
Credit guarantee schemes as a means to reduce credit risks, in order to
promote lending to small and micro-entrepreneurs, have had questionable
impact. Few such schemes appear to be sustainable (see Levitsky and
Prasad, 1987; Graham Bannock and Partners, 1995). A recent
development which may be replicable involves the provision of guarantees
by borrower-groups. It incorporates principles of transparent financial risk-
sharing by members into the group lending model (the latter on its own
having been markedly less successful in SSA than in Asia). Other non-
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financial services, including extension and training, which have proved
valuable in successful group lending experiences such as the Grameen
Bank case, are also provided. The Mutualist Credit Guarantee Scheme in
Ghana, similar to the Chikola Scheme operated by K-REP in Kenya,
operates with borrower groups pooling savings (deposits) which constitute
the bulk of the guarantee fund. The funds are deposited with the lending
FFI to cover loan defaults. Self-selection is a key principle, and in the
Ghanaian case the group contribution was matched by donor funding.
Increasing women’s access
Credit programmes should aim to increase women’s access to credit
within the formal sector by (a) direct contact or (b) linking informal and
formal financial activities. Credit schemes need to either overcome or by-
pass the constraints which restrict women’s access to credit. Since the
most relevant constraints vary from country to country, one should be wary
of a blueprint approach to designing micro-finance schemes. Potential
solutions to common constraints include:
. out-of-hours opening or mobile services, or locating services where
women are, e.g. in market places;
. relaxing literacy requirements;
. flexible collateral requirements, e.g. accepting jewellery rather than
land Weidemann (1992) points out that women’s assets are likely to
be in non-liquid form such as jewellery or household furnishing; see
also ATRCW (1990); and
. allowing loans of a suitable size (usually small).
Experience has shown that women’s groups can play an important role.
Groups can form the basis for savings mobilization, which is important to
ensure sustainability. The programme should seek to relate savings to the
client’s needs, so that she may draw on surpluses after meeting credit
obligations. In addition, credit efforts must seek to improve the repayment
rate and provide a system of credit supervision, thus ensuring that the
loan is properly used.
Women also need to be able to access savings facilities as a source of
finance. Research has shown that women are responsible and disciplined
savers. Accion International, for example, has a compulsory savings
component with high levels of female participation. Egypt’s Agricultural
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Credit Project records that 25% of savings are made by women, while
women constitute only 20% of participants. In Ghana, mobile bankers help
women traders accumulate savings via a small daily deposit which can be
as little as 25 cents. This is then returned at the end of the month to
enable stock to be replenished or consumption goods purchased. There
are over 500 of these mobile bankers or susu collectors in Accra. Mobile
bankers act as intermediaries between small informal savers, borrowers,
and the formal banking sector. They play an important role in mobilizing
savings in Ghana through their daily collection.
Women’s access to financial services can be facilitated and fostered by
organizations that work on their behalf, whether or not based on
membership. This participatory or group approach has gained widespread
acceptance and has many advantages. In terms of the formal sector, it
allows women to access loans of smaller amounts than the bank’s
minimum. Banks that are unable to lend money to women due to the lack
of collateral are coming up with new ideas of lending to legalized women’s
groups, for example, the Cooperative Bank of Uganda, AID Bank of
Ethiopia, and Banque de Development de Rwanda.
Linking formal with informal
The informal financial sector is vitally important to poor people’s
livelihoods. Family groups, and other social organizations built on social
capital, are important as are private individuals, enterprises and
organizations which provide specific services, such as private money
lenders, pawn shops and money guards.
Private individuals can provide fair and efficient services (although they do
not always do so). Their advantage is their ability to use local information
and access to clients to reduce transaction costs. However, they are
generally not financial intermediaries, and frequently lend from their own
equity, thereby limiting the scale of their operations. This may contribute to
high interest rates as the limited supply of credit drives up the cost of capital.
There may be scope for encouraging the private money lenders and money
guards to link with the formal sector. Acting as financial intermediaries would
increase the potential supply of credit, and would allow a greater number of
participants to enter the profession. Both of these benefits would potentially
lower the cost of credit and increase access to credit. Money guards
(providing a money safeguarding/saving service) would also benefit from
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access to formal financial institutions. They could save the money collected
from individuals (as has happened in Ghana), thereby increasing the benefits
from safeguarding. This may reduce safeguarding fees, or even, if
safeguarders realize a high interest rate and a degree of competition exists,
result in interest being paid to individual savers.
The advantages of the informal sector are the low transaction costs,
flexibility, easy and rapid access, and innovative ways of overcoming
collateral constraints (fear of social exclusion, local information, peer
pressure). However, localized informal systems are vulnerable to covariate
shocks. Moreover, they rarely provide longer-term loans or savings
options, and do not have the same level of legal security as formal
systems (though this could be improved by the conversion of informal
institutions into formal), meaning that their position could be abused.
Linkage banking
The concept of linkage banking incorporates many of the ideas already
discussed, building on the relative strengths of existing FFIs and IFIs.
Figure 1 illustrates how various financial and non-financial public
organizations and NGOs could collaborate in the provision of financial
services for the poor. The use of informal financial intermediaries and non-
financial institutions may increase geographical coverage helping to plug
information gaps, and reducing and sharing transaction costs.
Figure 1 The linkage banking model
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Experiences with decentralized banking
Decentralized banking involves the establishment of branches which
operate as completely autonomous units. This means that even though
units may be networked to central apex bodies (as is the case in Ghana),
or to the headquarters of a commercial bank (as in Indonesia), their
operations, management and accounts are entirely separate. Different
approaches include transforming branches of centralized commercial
banks into autonomous units, conversion of non-financial NGOs into
financial institutions, and promotion of ‘unit banks’ (see below) having
broad-based private ownership.
The Indonesian Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) or People’s Bank of
Indonesia is an example of this approach. In 1984 it was converted from a
centralized commercial bank to a network of independently operating unit
banks (unit desas) providing full financial services at the local level. The
conversion occurred as part of measures to liberalize the financial sector.
It was a means of reducing the impact of financial restructuring of banks
on access by the poor (especially the rural poor). The BRI maintained its
state-owned status and central monitoring role. Jazayeri (1996) reports on
its success in fully covering its lending requirements from mobilized
deposits, whilst being financially sustainable and covering a large number
of borrowers within a short time span.
The application of this model to low-income agricultural economies could,
however, expose individual local banks to covariate risk, causing their
collapse. This risk can be mitigated (but not eliminated) by encouraging
local ownership, and/or adhering to some sort of apex structure. Local
ownership may help create the conditions to realize the main benefit that
decentralization offers, i.e. the provision of a service tailored to the needs
of its clients (even if they are poor and located in rural areas).
Broad-based ownership of autonomous single unit banks, through the
acquisition of shares, by people in communities in which the units are
located, has been used successfully to decentralize banking in Ghana and
Nigeria. The community-owned rural banks in Ghana and rural banks in
Nigeria are unit banks partly owned (through share subscription) and
managed by directors (elected from among shareholders) who are
responsible for appointing and supervising management staff and other
personnel. The banks essentially mobilize finance from, and lend to,
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clients within their catchment areas, thus avoiding diversion of rural
resources to fund urban non-poor activities.
Yet there is also a risk that lack of control from the centre may isolate
local banks from (a) accepted standards of operation and (b) scrutiny
(leading to increased risk of fraud). Decentralization must therefore be
accompanied by any necessary training of local staff, strong systems of
accountability, and an effective regulatory framework. Apex structures may
play a role in this, whilst also facilitating access to information and giving
additional weight to negotiations with national (possibly public)
organizations and NGOs.
Although the state played a pioneering role in the establishment of these
banks, their operations were insulated from direct political interference.
This contributed significantly to their success in mobilizing savings and
lending. Notably, there was minimal dependence on donor and central
government concessional funds. Savings mobilization was particularly
enhanced by the adoption of flexible operating systems and procedures
similar to those discussed above. Although the difficult financial
environment in which they operated had an adverse impact on their
performance, Seibel (1996) observed that they functioned more robustly
than other commercial banks (particularly the state-owned ones).
Conversion of NGOs into financial institutions
In recent times a number of not-for-profit NGOs have converted from
providers of mainly non-financial services into full-service financial
institutions. The best known example in SSA is K-REP in Kenya. This
trend owes as much to the failure of liberal market reforms to improve the
supply of finance to the poor as to the weak performance of state-
sponsored ‘supply-led targeted credit programmes’. Typically, NGOs that
converted were those that had achieved substantial success in terms of
outreach to the poor in the provision of non-financial services. Provision of
credit had generally been a supplement to their core activities, which they
used as an entry point.
Despite reported success in Latin America (with the case of Bancosol in
Bolivia being the most prominent), the trade-off between increased
outreach to the poor and sustainability of financial institutions is becoming
increasingly apparent. The majority of NGOs are predominantly grant-
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funded by donors and are therefore able to finance activities which do not
require full cost recovery and self-financing. This enables them to provide
subsidized services for those whom the private sector is unwilling to
service (due to high risks and high costs). These grant-funded services
are not sustainable. Conversion into formal financial institutions creates
new financial demands and necessitates a review of risks and costs,
which could lead to a preference for larger, safer and more profitable
clients at the expense of the poor. The K-REP experience also shows that
the conversion process can be significantly impeded by licensing and
regulatory problems.
Facilitating access to finance by reducing production and marketing
risks
In lending to the poor, this model helps address high transaction costs in
deposit mobilization, high risks, and missing insurance markets. The
potential for links between banks and IFIs (such as credit unions and susu
collectors) to enhance deposit mobilization is discussed above. Here the
focus is on linkages which reduce production and marketing risks. NGOs
have played a crucial role in piloting such interventions. Two examples
from SSA are discussed, namely Sasakawa Global 2000 (SG 2000) and
TechnoServe.
SG 2000 operates in a number of African countries including Tanzania,
Sudan, Ghana, Zambia, Benin and Togo. It is involved in technology
transfer to small-scale farmers. In providing extension services and
training for groups of farmers, it relies on the demonstration effect of its
Production Test Plots scheme. This hands-on scheme involves a network
of organizations including public agencies. State extension services, local
research institutions and SG 2000 pool their knowledge, personnel and
logistics to transfer production technology to organized farmer groups.
Credit for inputs is provided by local banks (the Agricultural Development
Bank in the case of Ghana) with SG 2000 staff assisting in screening and
monitoring of loan beneficiaries.
SG 2000 also provides credit guarantees ranging from 100% for new
borrowers to 0% for those who have established credible track records
with the banks (through the programme). SG 2000 is able to assume this
risk because of the comparative superiority of its information on the ability
of the participating farmers to repay loans. It is in a better position than
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FFIs to estimate output due to better knowledge of the production
technology being used. A close working relationship with farmers also
enhances the ability of its staff to build a more accurate picture of the
behaviour of individuals, thus enhancing its capacity to screen out
potential defaulters. In principle, as farmers establish a track record, they
are weaned off the guarantee scheme.
TechnoServe uses a similar approach in promoting post-harvest crop
management. It operates in a number of African countries including
Rwanda, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(formerly Zaire). It organizes, trains and assists groups of farmers,
microprocessors and larger agribusiness enterprises in adopting
appropriate technology needed for improving the shelf-life and marketing
of agricultural products. Local banks involved in the programme provide
credit for the acquisition of equipment and inputs. TechnoServe provides
explicit screening and implicit monitoring support in the credit delivery
process.
These programmes have demonstrated the potential benefits from
transferring improved production and post-harvest technology to farmers
and microprocessors in SSA. They have also shown that credit provision
in support of such schemes can be undertaken without sacrificing the
commercial interests of banks. The involvement of NGOs and state
agencies in improving output and promoting post-harvest management, so
as to stabilize incomes, reduces the risks faced by beneficiaries and
banks. Close interaction with the beneficiaries reduces information
asymmetry problems, leading to lower screening and monitoring costs for
FFIs, while improving loan repayment. These factors are crucial in
facilitating access to credit.
Such schemes clearly hold promise, and appear to be cost-effective.
However, more experience is needed before their wider potential, and their
sustainability once NGO support is withdrawn, can be assessed.
Self-help groups
Group saving and credit activities have had some success. Transaction
costs are kept down, as the screening and monitoring of loans is
performed by the group members (who may have joint liability for loan
repayment). If such groups link to the formal sector, there is potential to
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reduce FFI transaction costs further by making a single large loan in place
of multiple small loans.
Informal self-help groups involved in micro-finance tend to be of two types:
those having rotating funds and those with non-rotating funds. Both have
received considerable attention. Bouman (1995) reports high levels of
participation amongst the adult population in sub-Saharan Africa.
The groups involved may not necessarily have financial activities as their
raison d’eˆtre, but organizations such as church groups or age-based
groups may be involved in some sort of financial service provision. As is
typical in the informal sector, these groups have evolved to respond to
local needs, and therefore have different characteristics and modes of
operation. Such self-help groups tend to prosper in times of increased
economic activity. In fact, one characteristic of the micro-finance activities
of self-help groups is that they tend to be temporary, with the rotation
period of ROSCAs often lasting only a year. This is often interpreted as
evidence of unsustainability and justification for promoting formal savings
and credit cooperatives. Yet in reality it is ‘‘precisely the non-permanency
that permits the ROSCA and ASCRA to adopt a new strategy to fit the
circumstances. They can do that as a self-regulating mechanism; they are
both product and producer of change.’’ (Bouman, 1994, p. 378).
However, despite these successes there remain questions: these group-
based innovations have not been universally successful, and their ability to
reach the poorest members of communities (who may not be able to
contribute regular savings) is limited. ROSCAs have a number of
drawbacks which diminish their appropriateness for the poor. With a set
rotation, members are aware of when they will have their turn to receive
the funds, though this will not necessarily fit in with when they need funds.
This limits the role of ROSCAs in providing emergency consumption credit,
and also the degree to which they can be used for productive credit,
especially in the RNR sector where rural populations have a simultaneous
need for investment finance at specific stages of the production cycle.
More useful are the more sophisticated organizations in which the fund is
not saved and distributed on a simple rotational basis. These institutions
have been termed ASCRAs (accumulating savings and credit
associations). Like ROSCAs, members pool savings, but these funds are
not necessarily redistributed at once. Savings may be voluntary and
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irregular. This allows a broader cross-section of members, with poorer
members able to contribute less to the savings pool. Loans are made on
demand from the savings pool, often carrying high rates of interest. As
with ROSCAs there is no model for ASCRAs, each having evolved to
provide for local circumstances. Some are very sophisticated, with rules
and regulations in print, and requiring a relatively advanced administration
(thereby increasing overheads).
Other institutions share characteristics of ROSCAs and ASCRAs. Such
hybrids may include auctions for deciding the distribution of rotating funds,
or other forms to compensate those receiving the funds at the end of the
cycle. Bouman (1994) provides an interesting example from Cameroon
(see Box 3). This shows that ROSCAs can develop into fairly
sophisticated institutions providing more than one service to their
members. Yet neither ROSCAs nor ASCRAs can deal effectively with a
simultaneous need for finance by all or most members.
NGOs have had mixed success in trying to link with self-help groups, or to
use the principle of self-help groups in project design. Box 4 describes two
contrasting experiences from Uganda which demonstrate the potential
pitfalls of NGO involvement in self-help groups. Bouman (1995) notes a
number of reasons for the mixed experiences:
Box 3 The tontine of the Bamileke people of north-west
Cameroon (from Bouman, 1994)
The tontine is a sophisticated form of ASCRA. After contributing to a monthly savings
pool, a principal auction is held for members to decide who will have the first turn in
receiving the pool. The person bidding highest wins the first turn. The amount bid is
subtracted from the total and transferred into a loan fund (minus administration costs).
This loan fund is then divided into smaller sums which are sold in a secondary auction.
Bids in the secondary auction are in monthly interest rates, with a fixed ceiling. All of
these loans must be repaid during the next session together with the interest accrued.
These repaid sums are then put into another secondary auction. These are added to by
the winning bid from the second principal auction. Therefore, the sum available for loans
in the secondary auction grows with each round. When the amount available in the
secondary auction equals the original sum in the savings pool, an additional principal
auction is held, and for that month two members will receive their turn. This reduces the
total length of the cycle. At the end of the rotation, the remaining funds are divided
equally among all members.
This informal, but sophisticated rotating finance system combines the advantages of the
ROSCA with the opportunity to gain timely access to short term credit.
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Box 4 NGOs and rural finance – experiences from central Uganda
Central eastern Uganda has distinctive socio-economic characteristics which have
implications for micro-finance services:
. the insurgencies of the late 1980s/early 1990s resulted in considerable social
disruption; many families left the area and their assets were lost
. the social disruption has led to local institutions breaking down, including informal
institutions which played a role in micro-finance (e.g. savings and credit groups)
. the area has a high proportion of female-headed households (up to 40% in some
communities)
. although infrastructure (transport, etc.) and soils are relatively good, poverty is
persistent because of capital and labour constraints to the uptake of improved
agricultural technology.
Two projects were reviewed, which demonstrated strikingly different approaches.
Vision Terudo (Ngora, Kumi District): this is a well-established local NGO, with a wide
portfolio of projects (including health, education, child sponsorship, and savings and
credit) supported by donors. The savings and credit programme is funded by a foreign
NGO. The programme has been operating for two years, providing relatively short-term
credit (maximum repayment period is one year) to individuals. The savings component
is a recent addition to the programme, and is not yet operational. The approach to
micro-finance is loosely based on Grameen Bank principles (group lending with regular
repayments). At the beginning, repayment rates of 60% were achieved. However, these
have since fallen to less than 10% in 1997, raising some important issues about the
design and implementation of the programme.
. the programme is supply-led, with individuals encouraged to take credit (debt)
without much control over how it is used, resulting in some unwise investments
and low repayment rates
. local staff had neither significant experience nor training in operating credit and
savings programmes
. there were poor accountability systems both at the project and the community
level
. services were not tailored to the financial needs of the population.
Koka Foundation is a relatively new indigenous NGO, and is much smaller in scale than
Vision Terudo. At present it receives no external funding, though it receives technical
assistance from the public sector and from the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Its entry
point is indigenous women’s savings and credit groups (ASCRAs), in which the women
pool funds either for working on communal projects or to make loans within the group. It
is demand-driven, with the groups paying membership to Koka for technical assistance.
Koka provides advice and technical assistance on the establishment and training of the
women’s groups, and also on production and marketing issues. It has also tried to link
the groups to services provided through the public sector and other agencies (such as
UNICEF). Koka staff are retired volunteers. The number of groups in the programme
has risen each year, and currently stands at over 30. All groups pay their membership
fees regularly and promptly, indicating an appreciation and satisfaction with the services
provided by the Koka Foundation. Although no funds from the NGO are channelled
directly for credit, the assistance provided by the NGO has contributed to the successful
operation of these informal savings and credit groups.
These case studies raise some interesting issues. The contrast between the two
projects is stark. Vision Terudo has ample funds and has distributed considerable loans,
though the communities appear to lack the willingness and/or capacity to utilize and
repay the funds. Little effort has been made to strengthen the capabilities of either the
project staff or the communities. The Koka Foundation, with no funds for providing
loans, has instead concentrated on developing capacities and community linkages – an
approach which appears more sustainable.
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. models which can be replicated do not exist; self-help groups have
evolved to suit the needs of local users and are therefore socially,
environmentally and economically specific to their locations;
. most NGOs have little experience in micro-finance; and
. foreign NGOs in particular are ‘‘inevitably projecting their own
ideologies and objectives onto societies with a completely different
culture and normative system’’ (Bouman, 1995, p. 382).
Fostering the enabling environment
It is possible that too much attention has been paid to the design of
savings/credit delivery innovation, and too little to the limitations of the
poor in making savings, and, importantly, using credit in productive ways.
Evidence shows that greater success (in terms of impact on incomes and
sustainability of the group) is achieved when credit is combined with non-
financial business development activities (Dawson and Jeans, 1997).
Micro-enterprise development generally assumes the availability of
productive resources (land, labour). The poorest, however, may lack land,
and may face seasonal labour constraints (though labour is often regarded
as ‘the poor’s greatest asset’). Secondly, micro-entreprise development
assumes some degree of entrepreneurship (which is difficult to measure,
though it may be related to education and business skills), and less
tangible aspects such as self-confidence, ambition and social networks.
Clearly, it is not everyone’s strength.
If productive credit is not to lead to a debt trap, it is important to consider
these issues. Productive credit should be channelled to those who have
the ability (and supporting services) to use it well. This will have knock-on
effects on the poor, creating labour opportunities – see Dawson and Jeans
(1997) for evidence of the labour creation resulting from small- and
medium-enterprise development. The poor will make better use of
productive credit where health and education needs have been met and
infrastructure investments permit access to land and markets.
Macro-economy
Evidence from most studies on financial sector development strongly
suggests that an enabling macro-economic environment is an important
prerequisite for improved financial intermediation. Price stability and fiscal
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policy are critical factors. Fiscal policy which reduces public sector
borrowing eases private sector access to credit and lowers nominal
borrowing costs. Most SSA countries, however, face considerable difficulty
in achieving this. FFIs, with their long history of state ownership and
control, are rarely effective in their demands for this, though donor
influence can be significant.
Regulations and deposit mobilization
There is evidence that tighter regulation and supervision tend to deepen
risk aversion in FFIs (Sheng, 1996; Ncube and Senbet, 1997; Soyibo,
1997). This improves portfolio management as a result of wiser loan
decisions, and lower default and per unit operating costs. Relaxing these
regulations to ease credit access could be counter-productive, if it leads to
poor portfolio quality and ineffective intermediation by banks.
The discussion of decentralized banking highlighted the need for effective
controls on the activities of semi-isolated, autonomous rural banks.
Promoting effective apex structures of the unit banks to serve as
coordinating points in developing linkages would minimize these problems.
The apex structures of BRI in Indonesia, Rabo Bank in The Netherlands
and the Association of Rural Banks in Ghana are models worth studying.
SUMMING UP
. Rural finance interventions to reduce poverty must be tailored to the
needs of the poor.
. Rural finance can be improved by strengthening both formal and
informal financial sectors, and by linking them to capitalize on their
respective strengths.
. Priorities for the formal sector are (a) deposit mobilization among the
poor, and (b) lowering credit access barriers, especially for women.
. The poor are heavily dependent on the informal sector. Policy-makers
and formal financial institutions can contribute to improved poverty
focus by recognizing the role of the informal sector, and adapting it or
complementing it.
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. The formal sector must find ways to reduce transaction costs; the
informal sector tends to have lower transaction costs due to
community-based information systems.
. Group saving and credit activities provide lessons on how to limit
transaction costs through group screening and monitoring.
. NGOs can help mobilize groups and provide training but subsidized
interventions have not had much success.
. Evidence shows that greater success (in terms of impact on incomes)
is achieved when credit is combined with non-financial business
development activities.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ASCRA accumulated savings and credit association
ATRCW Africa Training and Research Centre for Women
BRI Bank Rakyat Indonesia
DFID Department for International Development
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation
FFI formal financial institution
IFI informal financial institution
GDP gross domestic product
K-REP Kenya Rural Enterprise Programme
NGO non-governmental organization
PRODEM Fundacion para la Promocion y Desarrollo de la
Microempresa
RNR renewable natural resources
ROSCA Rotating Savings and Credit Association
SG 2000 Sasakawa Global 2000
UNICEF United Nations’ Children’s Fund
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